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UNITED STATES V. DRAYTON: THE NEED
FOR BRIGHT-LINE WARNINGS DURING
CONSENSUAL BUS SEARCHES
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Drayton, the Supreme Court reviewed the methods
that the Tallahassee Police Department used during a routine consensual
search of passengers aboard a Greyhound bus.' Bus searches have become
a method routinely used by police departments to seek out drugs and
weapons, as part of their War on Crime.2 However, these searches have
increasingly been challenged as unconstitutional violations of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.3
During the search at issue in Drayton, bundles of cocaine were found on the
bodies of two bus passengers, Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown, Jr.4
This discovery led to the arrests of the two men, and both were charged
with possession and conspiracy to distribute. 5  The case reached the
Supreme Court on the issue of whether consensual bus searches are
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment when police officers do not
notify passengers that they have the right to refuse to comply with the
6officers' requests. Both Respondents claimed that without such notice, the
factors existing at the time of the search made the environment unduly
coercive, and that their consent was involuntary.7 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of the two Respondents, holding
1 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
2 Dennis J. Callahan, The Long Distance Remand: Florida v. Bostick and the Re-
Awakened Bus Search Battlefront in The War on Drugs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365
(2001).
3 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); United States v. Broomfield, 201
F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cuevas-Ceja, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (D. Or.
1999).
4 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199.
5Id.
6 Id. at 197.
I d. at 199.
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that the evidence was uncovered during an unconstitutional search and
seizure and therefore must be suppressed.8
In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that there is
no per se requirement that an officer notify bus passengers of their right to
refuse to cooperate with the officer's demands.9 Instead, a situation's
coerciveness must be examined by applying a totality-of-circumstances test,
where the absence of a warning is just one factor for consideration.'0
Justice Kennedy analyzed the specific bus search at issue using this
standard, and found that the officers did not act in a coercive manner;
therefore, they did not unconstitutionally seize the Respondents." The
Court then addressed whether the suspicionless search was involuntary, and
found that because the Respondents had not been seized, there was nothing
to indicate that they were forced to consent to the search. 12 The Court
therefore reversed and remanded the case. 13 Justice Souter, in a dissent
joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, claimed that the circumstances
surrounding the encounter did amount to an illegal seizure.' 4 The dissent
found that the officers' actions were sufficiently coercive to convince the
passengers that they were required to comply with the officers' demands;
any consent the Respondents gave to the officers' search requests were
therefore invalid.'
5
This Note argues that the totality-of-circumstances test which the
Court uses to evaluate consensual bus searches is improper. These searches
are similar to custodial interrogations, and just as individuals in those
situations are afforded the protections of the bright-line Miranda warning,
the Court should adopt a bright-line rule to apply to bus searches. A
mandatory warning should be given to bus passengers before officers begin
their search, notifying them of their constitutional right to refuse to
cooperate with the officers. Such a rule would lead to more consistent court
rulings, by removing the subjectivity that undermines the success of the
totality-of-circumstances test. A warning would also take into account
important factors which have been ignored by courts that have assessed the
circumstances surrounding consensual bus searches. The impact that the
warning would have on the officers' ability to detect drugs and weapons
8 United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 791 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
9 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203.
1o Id.
Id. at 203-04.
I d. at 206-08.
'3 Id. at 208.
14 Id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
15 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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would be minimal in comparison to the empowerment that citizens would
gain by being aware of, and having the ability to exercise, their
constitutional rights.
1I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. CONSTITUTIONAL SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The first clause of the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment
guards "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."' 6 Since
the creation of the Bill of Rights, courts have consistently stressed this right
as a priority, stating that "[n]o right is held more sacred ... than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others . . . ."" However, this amendment
does not extend so far as to allow people to completely isolate themselves,
but only "prevent[s] arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement
officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals. 18
Despite the amendment's importance, its vague, unelaborated wording
has led many courts to curse its "vice of ambiguity." 19 Without more
direction, courts have had to define the Amendment's scope, and determine
the situations in which it should apply.20 A three-tiered system has emerged
from the case law which distinguishes between different types of police
intrusions and determines the constitutionality of each based on its specific
circumstances.21
The most traditional type of intrusion requires both probable cause and
a court-issued warrant before officers may confront a person or commence
a search. This system was the original idea of 'reasonable' envisioned by
the drafters of the Fourth Amendment, and these prerequisites have had
continued importance. 23 Still, according to the Supreme Court, in most
16 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
18 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
19 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 67 (2d ed. rev. 1997)
(quoting JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42 (1966)).
20 Andrea K. Mitchell, United States v. Drayton: Supreme Court Upholds Standards for
Police Conduct During Bus Searches, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2002).
21 Callahan, supra note 2, at 369-70.
22 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
23 Callahan, supra note 2, at 369-70.
10592003]
SUPREME COURT RE VIEW
cases "searches conducted . . . without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment .... ."24
Despite this per se standard, two main exceptions have been carved out
which allow officers to proceed with a search without probable cause and a
warrant.2 ' The first deviation from the general standard has been termed
'reasonable suspicion,' and was established by the Supreme Court in Terry
v. Ohio.26 There, the Court distinguished limited seizures and searches
from a "full-blown search for evidence of crime., 2 7 This lesser intrusion,
called a "frisk," is a quick, limited search of a person's outer clothing,
which may only be done when an officer "observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous ....,,28 The establishment of this second
type of legitimate police intrusion was significant; for the first time, the
Court was expanding "the range of encounters between the police and the
citizen" that was held to be acceptable under the Fourth Amendment.29
The second exception, consensual searches, further extended
acceptable interactions between police and citizens by completely doing
away with the need for any sort of suspicion at all. 30 This exception is
based on the theory that "not all personal intercourse between policemen
and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons., 31 A police officer has the right
to approach any citizen and question that person. 32 If the person who is
approached chooses to respond to the officer's questions and comply with
the officer's requests, any search which then occurs does not require
probable cause and a warrant.33 There is only one requirement needed for
such a search to be constitutional: the person approached must be "free to
24 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
25 See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-
31 (1968). Note that other exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements have
been supported by the Supreme Court. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent
circumstances); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to lawful arrest);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile exception); Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 321 (1987) (plain view doctrine).
26 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
27 Id. at 8.
28 id.
29 California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 635 (1991).
30 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
31 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
32 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983).
33 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980).
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disregard the police presence and go about his business" without being
detained or punished for doing so.34
B. DETERMINING VOLUNTARINESS IN CONSENT-BASED SEARCHES
Evidence uncovered during an unconstitutional search is generally
suppressed and cannot be used at trial.35 Therefore, in consensual searches,
police officers must be certain to have valid permission from the citizens
they question, and must be able to prove consent in the courtroom.
36
However, proving that a third person actually gave consent is difficult.
37
People who are arrested as a result of a consensual search will often later
claim that they did not give permission. Also, many defendants who did
give consent claim that such consent was given involuntarily because they
were being questioned in a coercive environment where they were unable to
avoid the police's questions.38
The Court has chosen to determine when searches were truly
consensual, and when the consent was the result of an illegal seizure, by
using a "voluntariness" standard. 39 This standard was first clearly defined
by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.40 In Schneckloth, a
defendant was charged with "possessing a check with intent to defraud"
after he was pulled over by a police officer because of burnt-out lights.
4'
The defendant allowed the officers to search his car, but at trial claimed that
his consent had been coerced.42
The Court determined that, based on "the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances," the defendant's consent was voluntary.43 This totality-of-
circumstances standard considers whether a person's consent was "coerced,
by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. 44 The
Government is not however required to prove that the defendant knew he
45had the right to refuse to allow the police to search his car.
34 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 (1988).
35 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36 Royer, 460 U.S. at 497.
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Royer, 460 U.S. at 497; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221
(1973).
39 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224.
40 Id. at 223.
41 Id. at 220.
42 Id. at 217, 220.
41 Id. at 226-27.
44 Id. at 228.
45 Id. at 234.
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Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall each dissented separately in
Schneckloth; all three challenged the Court's finding that it is unnecessary
for citizens to know their Fourth Amendment rights 6  Marshall, in
sentiments echoed by the other two dissenters, argued that a person's
"consent cannot be considered a meaningful choice unless he knew that he
could in fact exclude the police."47 By finding consent in the face of such
an omission of knowledge, the Court allows police to have "the continued
ability ... to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by
subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing
relinquishment of constitutional rights.A
8
Similar cases following the Schneckloth decision relied on the totality-
of-circumstances test that the Court created. 9  Eight years after
Schneckloth, in Mendenhall, the Supreme Court refined the test by adding a
new factor-the free-to-leave standard. 50  The Court concluded that "a
person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment...
if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' Such a
situation only occurs when, "by means of physical force or a show of
authority, [a citizen's] freedom of movement is restrained., 52 Once the
citizen has been 'seized' by the police, any consent given is viewed as being
"the product of duress or coercion,"53 and therefore is involuntary. 4
The Court in Mendenhall gave some general examples of coercion, 55
but later cases lay out in greater detail what 'shows of authority' are
coercive to the point of making a reasonable person believe they were
detained.56 In Florida v. Royer, the Supreme Court held that police officers
had "illegally detained" a person when they took his identification, told him
46 Id. at 275-90 (Douglas, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
47 Id. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48 id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49 See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980).
50 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
51 Id.
52 id. at 553.
" Id. at 545.
14 Id. at 553.
55 These factors include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled." Id. at 554.
56 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)
(plurality opinion).
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that he was suspected of "transporting narcotics," and brought him into a
storage closet to be questioned by two officers.57 The defendant testified
that he did not believe that the officers would let him leave the room, and
the State conceded that this was likely true.58 Since the officers had no
probable cause justifying the confinement, they had no right to put the
defendant in that position.59 Therefore, the officers' actions violated the
free-to-leave test established in Mendenhall, and amounted to an illegal
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 60 The consent that this person gave
when he was in the small room was "ineffective to justify the search,",61 so
any evidence collected in the search had to be suppressed.62
The scope of what constitutes unconstitutional confinement was
narrowed one year after Royer, in INS v. Delgado.63 The respondents,
workers at three factories, claimed that searches done at their workplaces by
INS agents violated their Fourth Amendment rights.64 They claimed that
the "several" armed agents who entered the factories and positioned
themselves next to all the exits65 "created a psychological environment
which made them reasonably afraid they were not free to leave."
66
However, the Court determined this was not a seizure because the
respondents should not have been leaving the buildings anyway; whenever
an employee is at his workplace, his "freedom to move about has been
meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but
by [their] voluntary obligations to their employers." 67 Also, the workers
were not actually confined because, as the search was conducted, they could
continue going "about their ordinary business," and could move about
within the factories.68
This decision was not unanimous, and the two Justices who dissented
in Schneckloth, Brennan and Marshall, felt that the situation in Delgado
amounted to an unreasonable search.69  They argued that the search
occurred "under conditions designed not to respect personal security and
57 Royer, 460 U.S. at 496-97, 507.
58 Id. at 496.
" Id. at 497.
61 Id. at 496-97.
6 Id. at 497.
61 Id. at 501.
63 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
64 Id. at 213.
65 Id. at 220.
66 Id. at 220.
67 Id at 218.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 226.
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privacy, but rather to elicit prompt answers from completely intimidated
workers." 70  While the majority claimed that the environment was not
coercive, the dissent believed that in light of the facts of the case, nobody
would actually "have the temerity to believe that he was at liberty to refuse
to answer their questions and walk away." 71 Instead of honestly and
objectively looking at the actual circumstances under which the search
occurred, the dissent claimed that the majority used a "sleight of hand.,
72
Marshall and Brennan believed that the Court's decision was skewed to
support the needs of the INS, and the constitutional rights of private citizens
were sacrificed in the process.73
C. BRIGHT-LINE RULES IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In the arena of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
continually stressed that a search's reasonableness is "measured in objective
terms by examining the totality of the circumstances., 74 A bright-line, per
se rule requiring police to notify citizens of their right to refuse has been
considered unrealistic 75 and unnecessary. 76  As the Royer Court stated,
"[T]here will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances.... [I]t is
unlikely that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that
will provide unarguable answers to the question [of] whether there has been
an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 7
Thus, courts make their determinations based on their assessments of the
circumstances in each case. 8
However, in the Fifth Amendment context, the totality-of-
circumstances test was rejected after years of use as the mandatory
standard. 79  The Fifth Amendment protects citizens against self-
incrimination, and requires that any confessions be voluntarily and
knowingly made.s° In that situation, the Court came to hold that the
totality-of-circumstances test was an insufficient measure of voluntariness,
70 Id. at 231 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 239-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 34 (1996).
71 Id. at 40.
76 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232 (1973).
77 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506-07 (1983).
78 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 202 ("[T]he proper inquiry 'is whether a reasonable person would
feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."' (quoting
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991))).
79 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"0 Id. at 478-79.
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because "assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed . . .can
never be more than speculation." 8' Prior to 1966, courts "evaluated the
admissibility of a suspect's confession under a voluntariness test,, 82 and
courts held that whether a confession "was obtained by coercion or
improper inducement can be determined only by an examination of all the
attendant circumstances.,
83
An evaluation based on the totality-of-circumstances was held to be
deficient in Miranda.84 Because of the "police-dominated atmosphere ' 85 in
which such confessions were drawn out, the Court expressed worry that
there had been an "abdication of the constitutional privilege" against self-
incrimination. 86 Fear that "the compelling atmosphere of the in-custody
interrogation, and not an independent decision on his part, caused the
defendant to speak" had increased. 87 As a result, the Court determined that
a totality-of-circumstances test may not always sufficiently reveal such
coercion. 88 Therefore, the Court decided to change the method used to
assess the validity of confessions, declaring that "in order to combat these
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised
of his rights . ,89 Only then will individuals being questioned know "of
their right of silence and [be assured of] a continuous opportunity to
exercise it." 90
The need for this bright-line, per se rule was reemphasized in a recent
decision by the Supreme Court.9' A Congressional Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
attempted to revert the standard back to a totality-of-circumstances test.
92
However, the Court in Dickerson held this Act to be unconstitutional,
stressing the concern raised in Miranda that "the traditional totality-of-the-
circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial
confession . . . . The Dickerson Court held that the Miranda warning
8 Id. at 468-69.
82 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000); see also Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
83 Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513.
84 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-72.
" Id. at 445.
86 Id. at 465.
87 Id. at 468-69.
88 Id. at 472.
89 Id. at 467.
90 Id.
91 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
92 Id. at 436.
93 Id. at 442.
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must still be used because "experience suggests that the totality-of-the-
circumstances test . . . is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement
officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner."
94
D. PREVIOUS COURT DECISIONS REGARDING BUS SEARCHES
As the war on drugs has reached new heights, police have had to
develop new tactics to combat the problem. 95 One such tactic has been
drug-interdiction bus sweeps, where officers board buses and, after
receiving passenger consent, conduct searches. 96 Such searches have been
criticized as too coercive, and lower court decisions had been split on the
constitutionality of such searches under the Fourth Amendment.
97
The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Florida v. Bostick.98 Here,
the Court reversed a decision by the Florida Supreme Court that held that
such searches were per se unconstitutional, and found that drug-interdiction
searches on buses are not always unconstitutional seizures. 99 The Court
relied on the totality-of-circumstances test to make this decision. 00
However, in order to allow for such searches despite the cramped
environment of a bus, the Court was forced to tweak the free-to-leave part
of the test.101 Because buses confine their passengers, and because the
searches occur in unfamiliar places where passengers cannot simply walk
away, a citizen really is not free to leave, as is required in all consensual
searches according to Mendenhall.l0 2 According to the Court in Bostick,
however, the inability to walk away cannot be the deciding factor in
determining the constitutionality of a search, because, like in Delgado, a
citizen's confinement during a bus search was "the natural result of his
decision to take the bus."'' 0 3 To address this problem, the Court changed the
standard; now, in bus searches, a court only must ask "whether a reasonable
94 Id. at 444.
95 Callahan, supra note 2, at 365.
96 Id.
97 See United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that
consensual searches on buses were not 'seizures' of the bus); United States v. Rembert, 694
F. Supp. 163, 176 (W.D.N.C. 1988). But see United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204, 207-
09 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that a bus is 'seized' even before police begin questioning the
accused).
9' 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
9 Id. at 433-34.
o Id. at 436.
10 Id. at 439.
102 Id. at 435.
103 Id. at 436.
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person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter."
' 0 4
In assessing the specific situation in the Bostick case, the Court
stressed two factors--"that the officers did not point guns at Bostick or
otherwise threaten him and that they specifically advised Bostick that he
could refuse consent."' 5 Both of these factors were clear proof, according
to the Court, that there was no message conveyed by the officers that
"compliance with their requests [was] required."10 6
After the Bostick decision, two federal cases out of Florida focused on
one of these factors-the officer's advice that the passengers could refuse to
consent-and began to set new standards which made bus searches more
difficult to conduct.10 7 In United State v. Guapi, the Eleventh Circuit held
that when passengers are not told that they have the right to refuse to
consent to the search, "the facts and circumstances of [a] search require
some indication to passengers that their cooperation was voluntary .... ,,108
According to this court, it is insufficient to simply avoid acting in a
coercive manner; the officers must in fact "behave in a manner calculated to
convey to a reasonable person that cooperation with law enforcement is
voluntary."' 0 9  While notification may not be required, it is "the most
efficient and effective method to ensure compliance with the
Constitution," 1 0 and therefore should always be used. The court concluded
that the specific conduct of the officers in the Guapi bus search, combined
with the cramped confines of the bus, was "carefully designed to convince
passengers that they had no choice but to accede to" the officer's
requests.11 ' Therefore, the evidence collected in that search had to be
suppressed.' 
2
A second Florida case, decided just a few months after Guapi, placed
even more emphasis upon the importance of an officer specifically
104 Id.
"05 Id. at 437.
106 Id.
107 See United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354 (1 1th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998).
108 Guapi, 144 F.3d at 1393.
'09 Id. at 1395.
110 Id.
... Id. at 1394-97. This conduct included: 1) a general announcement made "very
quickly" by an officer which asked for the passengers "consent and cooperation," id. at
1396; 2) the officer standing in front of the person he was questioning, id.; and 3) the
statement of the bus driver, who had seen many of these searches, that he did not think the
passengers had the right to avoid the search. ld. at 1396-97.
112 Id. at 1397.
2003] 1067
SUPREME CO UR T RE VIE W
informing passengers of their right not to consent to the search. 13 The
Court stated that an officer holding up a police badge was a "show of
authority" sufficient to establish a seizure, and that "[a]bsent some positive
indication that they were free not to cooperate, it is doubtful a passenger
would think he or she had the choice to ignore the police presence." ' 14 This
court stressed that explicit warnings were the only way for the police to
"genuinely . . . ensure that their encounters with bus passengers remain
absolutely voluntary."
' 1 5
The Washington and Guapi decisions impacted other circuits in
differing ways.' l 6 The Ninth Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit's lead
and held that a bus search was unconstitutional even when an officer
announced that "no one is under arrest, and you are free to leave. However,
we would like to talk to you.' '7 Such an announcement, according to the
court, made the passengers believe that they could either get off the bus or
consent to the search, but that they could not simply stay on the bus and
refuse to answer the officers' questions." 8 This alone was coercive and
misleading enough to make the situation unconstitutional. 19
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, felt that the Washington decision
created "a per se rule that authorities must notify bus passengers of the right
to refuse consent before questioning those passengers."' 120  This court
rejected such a bright-line rule as inconsistent with Bostick, and instead
demanded that a totality-of-circumstances analysis be applied in bus search
cases.'21
"3 United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1356 (lth Cir. 1998). Here, a bus
search was unconstitutionally coercive when: 1) the officers were casually dressed with guns
in fanny packs; 2) one officer made an announcement while holding up his badge, asking the
passengers to show them their bus ticket and photo identification and to identify their
luggage; and 3) the officers began their questioning from the back of the bus, to avoid
blocking the aisles. Id. at 1355.
... Id. at 1357.
115 id.
116 See United States v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2000).
117 Stephens, 206 F.3d at 916.
'1 Id. at 917.
119 Id.
120 Broomfield, 201 F.3d at 1275.
121 Id at 1274. However, this court did agree with the Guapi decision, and felt that the
circumstances surrounding that bus search "understandably warranted a finding of coercion."
Id.
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 4, 1999, a Greyhound bus en route from Fort Lauderdale,
Florida to Detroit, Michigan made a routine bus stop in Tallahassee,
Florida. 22  Three officers from the Tallahassee Police Department's
("TPD") Drug Interdiction Team, Lang, Blackburn and Hoover, were at the
bus station. 23  These officers routinely performed bus searches at this
station, boarding buses coming in from Southern Florida to search out drugs
and weapons. 24  TPD officers have "conducted such searches for three
years, up to six or seven buses a day, four or five days a week."'125 A low
estimate would be that the officers had searched over 78,000 bus passengers
during that period. 1
26
During this particular stop, all the passengers exited the bus so that it
could be cleaned and refueled. 27 When this was finished, the passengers
reboarded the bus, giving their tickets to the driver as they entered. 28 Once
all the passengers were back on the bus, about five minutes before the
scheduled departure time, the three TPD officers got permission from the
driver and boarded the bus.' 29  The driver went into the terminal to
complete some paperwork, and was not present during the search that
followed. 3 °
The three officers were "dressed casually and their badges were either
hanging around their necks or held in their hands."' 3 ' They each had a set
of handcuffs and a gun, which were kept inside holsters and concealed
under draped shirts.' 32 After boarding, and without any sort of general
announcement, Officers Lang and Blackburn immediately walked to the
back of the bus. 133 Officer Hoover stayed at the front of the bus and knelt
on the bus driver's seat, facing the rear of the bus in order to watch the
passengers as they were searched. 134 When Blackburn and Lang reached
122 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197.
123 Brief for Respondents at 2, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No. 01-
631).
124 Id. at 2.
121 Id. at 3 n.4.
126 id.
127 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197.
128 Brief for Respondents at 2, Drayton (No. 01-631).
129 Id. at 3; Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197.
130 Brief for the United States at 2-4, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No.
01-631).
"3' Drayton, 231 F.3d at 788.
132 Brief for Respondents at 4, Drayton (No. 01-63 1).
133 id.
134 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197-98.
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the rear of the bus, Blackburn remained there, facing forward in order to
observe the search, while Lang began speaking with passengers.
35
Standing either beside or behind each person, in order to keep the aisle
clear, he "asked [them] about their travel plans and sought to match
passengers with luggage in the overhead racks."' 136 In some instances, with
consent, Lang would search a passenger's bag.'
37
The two Respondents, Drayton and Brown, were seated on the driver's
side of the bus; Drayton was seated on the aisle and Brown was at the
window seat.' 38 When Lang reached them, he bent over Drayton's shoulder
from behind, "held up his badge long enough for the defendants to see that
he was a police officer and, with his face 12-18 inches away from Drayton's
face ... spoke in a voice just loud enough for the defendants to hear."'
139
He told the two men: "I'm Investigator Lang with the Tallahassee Police
Department. We're conducting bus interdiction [sic], attempting to deter
drugs and illegal weapons being transported on the bus. Do you have any
bags on the bus?"'140  Both defendants pointed to the same bag in the
overhead rack.' 4 1 When asked, Brown allowed Lang to check the bag.'
42
No contraband was found.
43
However, at this point Lang noticed that the men were wearing "heavy
jackets and baggy pants.' 44 He became suspicious because he knew from
experience that "drug traffickers often use baggy clothing to conceal
weapons or narcotics.' ' 45 Therefore, Lang asked Brown if he could "pat
him down for weapons." 46 Brown replied, "Sure," pulled a cell phone
from his pocket and opened his jacket. 47 Lang patted down Brown's jacket
and waist area, and then "proceeded to check his groin area and touched an
unknown object in that area.' 148 Because Lang recognized the hard objects
... Id. at 198.
136 id.
137 Brief for Respondents at 4, Drayton (No. 01-631).
138 Brief for the United States at 4, Drayton (No. 01-631).
139 Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 789 (1 th Cir. 2000).
140 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 198.





146 Brief for the United States at 5, Drayton (No. 01-631). Note that both the
Respondents and the U.S. noted in their briefs that Lang asked specifically to search for
weapons. However, in the Supreme Court decision, Kennedy quoted Lang as simply asking
Brown, "[d]o you mind if I check your person?" Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199.
14' Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199.
148 Brief for Respondents at 8, Drayton (No. 01-63 1).
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from other searches as drug packages, Brown was arrested, handcuffed, and
escorted off the bus.'
49
Lang then turned to Drayton, asking, "Mind if I check you?' 150 In
response, Drayton simply raised "his hands about eight inches from his
legs." '51 Lang did a similar pat-down search, and detected the same hard
objects that he felt on Brown.152 Drayton was also arrested, and taken off
the bus.' 53 While on the bus, neither man was informed that they had the
"right to refuse to cooperate."'' 54
Once off the bus, the two men were read their Miranda rights. 155 Lang
then "unbuttoned their trousers and found plastic bundles of powder
cocaine duct-taped between several pairs of boxer shorts."' 56  Drayton
possessed 295 grams of cocaine, and Brown had 483 grams of cocaine.
Based on this evidence, both men were charged with violating 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 846, for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute it.157
At trial, the defendants brought motions to suppress the evidence
collected during the search.' 58 Each claimed that their consent to the pat-
down search was coerced and involuntary. 59 Therefore, they asserted, the
search violated their Fourth Amendment rights. 60  The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied the defendants'
motions. 161  After hearing only Lang testify, the Court held that
"[e]verything that took place between Officer Lang and Mr. Drayton and
Mr. Brown suggests that it was cooperative. There was nothing coercive,
there was nothing confrontational about it."'162 Based on the evidence found
on them during the bus search, Drayton and Brown were both convicted.
163
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the trial court's conviction of the defendants and remanded the case to the





114 Id. at 198.
155 Brief for Respondents at 9, Drayton (No. 01-631).
'56 Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 789-90 (1 th Cir. 2000).
157 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 200.
160 Drayton, 231 F.3d at 788.
161 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200.
162 id.
163 Drayton, 231 F.3d at 788 n.1.
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district court, with instructions to grant the defendants' motions to
suppress. 164  Relying on Washington, the court found that "these
defendants' consent was not sufficiently free of coercion to serve as a valid
basis for a search."'' 65 The facts of this case, the court held, were so similar
to those in Washington as to control this decision.166 Because the bus
search in Washington was held to violate the Fourth Amendment, this
search was unconstitutional as well. 
67
The Court of Appeals relied upon the precedent of Washington despite
the existence of a few differences between the two cases. The rest of the
decision was devoted to explaining why these differences were not
"material."'' 68  First, by displaying his badge, leaning in closely, and
explaining to the defendants that he was conducting a search, Lang
presented "a specific show of authority passenger-by-passenger," which
was just as coercive as a general announcement like the one used in
Washington.169 Second, the fact that Lang did not ask for any sort of
documentation before conducting the search, as the officers in Washington
had, was simply not significant to the court.' 70 Third, Lang's testimony that
"during the past year five to seven people had declined to have their
luggage searched," was not considered persuasive because "Lang did not
testify that the statements the officers made and the methods they used in
the searches where passengers declined to give consent or exited the bus
were the same as in this case."' 7' Furthermore, considering the number of
buses Lang searched in that year, the "six or seven refusals out of hundreds
of requests is not very many.' 7  The last factor which differentiated
Washington from the current case was that, in Washington, there was no
officer positioned at the front of the bus, as Hoover was positioned during
the Drayton search. The Eleventh Circuit felt that the officer's presence in
that position "might make a reasonable person feel less free to leave the
bus," exacerbating the coerciveness of the situation. 173
" id. at 791.
161 Id. at 788.





171 Id. at 790-9 1.
172 Id. at 791.
173 Id. (citing United States v. Hill, 228 F.3d 414 (1 1th Cir. July 24, 2000) (unpublished
opinion) ("The presence of an officer at the exit, even if not so intended, is an implication to
passengers that the searches are mandatory.")).
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On January 4, 2002, the United States Supreme Court granted the
United States' petition for certiorari. 174 The Court granted the petition in
order to decide whether the Court of Appeals had properly analyzed the
circumstances under which the bus search took place. 7 5 Relying upon the
totality-of-circumstances test established in Schneckloth, the Court would
determine whether the environment was so coercive as to be a "seizure,"
and whether the searches of Drayton and Brown violated their Fourth
Amendment rights. 1
76
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, 77 the Supreme Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit's decision and held that "the totality of circumstances
indicates that [the defendants'] consent was voluntary, so the searches were
reasonable."'7 8  Rejecting the standard established in Washington and
Guapi, which required some positive show by the officers indicating that
consent was not required, the Court determined that searches are acceptable
as long as officers do not give passengers any "reason to believe that they
were required to answer the officers' questions.'
179
After detailing the facts of the case, Kennedy began his discussion
with an overview of the limits of Fourth Amendment protections, 80
stressing that even without any suspicion, law enforcement officials have
the right to approach any citizen, and ask them questions or for consent to
search their belongings.' 8' As long as the citizen is not coerced into
complying with the officers' questions or requests, and can "terminate the
encounter," there has been no unconstitutional action by the police.'
82
Kennedy also explained the special totality-of-circumstances test for bus
searches established in Bostick, which does not rely on whether a
174 United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787 (lth Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 534 U.S.
1074.
17' Drayton, 536 U.S. at 196-97.
176 Id at 197-98.
177 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer joined
Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion. Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg.
17' Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207.
179 Id. at 203.
180 Id. at 200-01.




reasonable person would feel free to walk away from the situation.' 83 Since
the person chose to enter the confining situation, the "proper inquiry 'is
whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests
or otherwise terminate the encounter."'
1 84
Next, Kennedy discussed the importance of a warning.1 85  Such a
warning is not a per se requirement.186 However, the Court felt that after
Washington and Guapi the Eleventh Circuit "would suppress any evidence
obtained during suspicionless drug interdiction efforts aboard buses in the
absence of a warning that passengers may refuse to cooperate."' 87 This
amounted to a per se rule and was therefore impermissible. 1
88
Kennedy demanded that an unbiased totality-of-circumstances test be
applied to the facts of the case.1 89 Based on this test, there was insufficient
proof that the defendants in the Drayton case were forced by the officers to
comply.' 90 In fact, there were no factors that should have given the
defendants the impression that they could not refuse to cooperate. The
officers did not display their weapons, left the aisle clear, and spoke to the
passengers individually "in a polite, quiet voice. ' 91 According to the
Court, this search was even less intimidating than a similar encounter
occurring on a street; here, because there were "many fellow passengers...
present to witness officers' conduct, a reasonable person may feel even
more secure in his or her decision not to cooperate with police on a bus than
in other circumstances."'
' 92
The decision discounted the three factors which the Respondents
argued had made the search coercive.193 Lang's display of his badge to the
two men was not an adequate show of authority to create a seizure, 194 and
the officers were neither wearing uniforms, nor brandishing their weapons,
which would have been more compelling shows of authority. 95 Hoover's
position in the driver's seat at the front of the bus was not persuasive
183 id.
184 Id. at 201-02 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)).
... Id. at 202.
186 Id. at 203.
187 id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 207.
190 Id. at 204.
191 Id.
192 id.
1' Id. at 204-05.
194 Id.; see Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. I, 5-6 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210
(1984).
195 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204-05.
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evidence of coercion because he "did nothing to intimidate passengers, and
he said nothing to suggest that people could not exit and indeed he left the
aisle clear."'196 Plus, Delgado allowed officers to stand at exits and question
anyone attempting to leave the building; in Drayton, the officer claimed he
would not even question those choosing to get off the bus.' 97 The last
factor, that so few passengers had refused to cooperate in the past, was
unimportant since the Court assumed that most people comply because they
"know that their participation enhances their own safety and the safety of
those around them."'198 According to Kennedy, it is impossible to conclude
that compliance is coerced simply from the fact that most people do
cooperate with the officers. 1
99
After determining that the passengers on the bus had not been seized,
Kennedy also stated that the two men's consent to the search was
voluntary. 200 Lang had asked permission from both men before beginning
any search, and "[n]othing Officer Lang said indicated a command to
consent to the search., 20 ' Even after Brown was arrested, Drayton still
could have refused to comply, since "the arrest of one person does not mean
that everyone around him has been seized by the police., 20 2  Drayton
voluntarily chose to cooperate.20 3
B. DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Souter20 4 disagreed with the majority's belief that the
circumstances surrounding the bus search did not amount to a seizure.2 °5
Like the majority, he did not believe that it is always necessary to warn
passengers that they can refuse to be questioned.20 6 However, "the facts
here surely required more from the officers than a quiet tone of voice."
207
Souter compared this situation to the questioning of a pedestrian on the




200 Id. at 206-07.
201 Id. at 206.
202 Id. However, the Court does mention, without discussing, the possibility that if, after
Brown was arrested, Drayton suddenly refused to comply, officer Lang "may have had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop and frisk on Drayton." Id. at 207.
203 Id. at 207 (Souter, J., dissenting).
204 Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined in Souter's opinion.
205 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 208-09 (Souter, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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street.208 A perfectly constitutional interaction occurs when a single officer
simply "goes up to a pedestrian on the street and asks him a question. 20 9
However, a very different situation arises when such questioning occurs in
a narrow alley, with "three officers, one of whom stands behind the
pedestrian, another at [the citizen's] side toward the open sidewalk, with the
third addressing questions to the pedestrian a foot or two from his face."
210
In the first situation the citizen likely felt that he could walk away, while in
the second, "the imbalance of immediate power is unmistakable." 211 This
imbalance, "even in the absence of explicit commands or the formalities of
detention," can be sufficient to "overbear a normal person's ability to act
freely," therefore constituting an unconstitutional seizure.
212
Souter drew a parallel between the second example and the search at
issue in Drayton.21 3 In both cases, the officers completely control the
environment. 214 Like in the alleyway, the three officers basically made
certain that the bus's exit could easily be blocked.215 The narrow aisles
meant that Lang addressed the passengers "at very close range," and,
because the overhead rack made it impossible for passengers to stand up
straight, "[d]uring the exchanges, the officers looked down, and the
passengers had to look up if they were to face the police.' 216 The authority
of these officers also seemed to supersede the driver's; the bus driver
"yielded his custody of the bus and its seated travelers to three police
officers" and, with possession of the passengers' tickets, waited in the bus
station while the search was conducted.2t 7 Furthermore, rather than asking
for the passengers' permission to conduct the search, the officers merely
displayed their badges, and stated that they were conducting the search and
"'would ... like cooperation.' 218 This statement made cooperation seem
219to be a preference rather than a requirement.
Such circumstances, to Souter, established an "atmosphere of
obligatory participation. 220 Only an "uncomprehending" passenger would
208 Id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting).
209 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting).
211 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
212 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
214 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 211 (Souter, J., dissenting).
216 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
218 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
220 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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believe that "he stood to lose nothing if he refused to cooperate with the
police, or that he had any free choice to ignore the police altogether.
'" 22'
Instead, as each passenger was questioned, he was "conscious of an officer
in front watching, one at his side questioning him, and one behind for
cover, in case he became unruly, perhaps, or 'cooperation' was not
forthcoming., 222 And the fact that passengers had refused to be searched in
the past was insignificant, since the circumstances surrounding those
instances were unknown and may have been very different from the
situation at hand.223
Souter also distinguished bus searches from the type of search
conducted in Delgado.224 In Delgado, even as the search was being
conducted, the employees could continue to perform their normal workday
business. 225 Conversely, because of the officers' search of the bus, "the
customary course of events was stopped flat., 2 26 With the bus stopped, and
the driver not even present, "it was reasonable to suppose no passenger
would tend to his own business until the officers were ready to let him.,
227
V. ANALYSIS
The totality-of-circumstances test does not adequately protect citizens'
rights in the context of bus searches. The Supreme Court has failed to
provide consistent guidance on what police conduct is unacceptable, and
there is simply no consensus among lower courts on which actions
constitute coercion and which are acceptable. The totality-of-circumstances
test has not been uniformly applied, and inconsistent and disputed decisions
will continue to be handed down without a change in the standard used to
measure coerciveness.
Bus searches are more similar to custodial interrogations than to
general consensual searches, and possess the same weaknesses which
forced the Court to create the Miranda warning.228 A similar bright-line
warning is necessary in this situation.229 A clear-cut standard is easier for
221 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
222 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 212-13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 213 (Souter, J., dissenting).
225 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
226 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
227 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter also pointed out that the Court's purpose in the
Delgado case was to consider granting summary judgment to the Respondents. Thus, the
Court had to construe all the facts in favor of the INS, rather than neutrally. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting).




courts to apply, and will end the continuous arguments in the courts over
which statements and actions are unduly coercive.2 30 Also, a warning can
prevent situational problems which are currently not considered: individual
knowledge of constitutional rights, unclear questioning tactics, and
psychological coercion.231
A. BUS SEARCHES OCCUR IN SITUATIONS THAT ARE VERY SIMILAR
TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS AND WHICH PRESENT THE
SAME RISKS OF COERCION
The Supreme Court has recognized that Fourth and Fifth Amendment
inquiries can be quite similar.23 2 In Boyd v. United States, the Court stated
that "the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man
to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in
the Fifth Amendment. 233  The main distinction between the two
amendments is the location of the questioning; while Fifth Amendment
questioning occurs when a suspect is in custody, searches performed within
the Fourth Amendment scope are done in non-custodial contexts.234
However, several factors distinguish bus searches from other Fourth
Amendment consensual searches, and align bus searches closely with
custodial interrogations. 235  Since the Miranda Court's holding was
extended to every situation where a citizen is "deprived of his freedom by
the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning," the
protections created for those situations should also cover bus searches.236
The basic distinction between custodial and non-custodial
interrogations is simply location.237  Generally, Fourth Amendment
searches occur with "'police officers visiting the house or place of business
of the suspect and there questioning him, probably in the presence of a
relation or friend.' ' 238 In such an environment, a person "is more keenly
aware of his rights and more reluctant" to cooperate with the officers.239
230 See infra Part B.
231 See infra Part C.
232 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
233 id.
234 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973).
235 See infra notes 227-61 and accompanying text.
236 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
237 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232.
238 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 n.46 (quoting Chalmers v. H.M. Advocate, [1954] Sess.
Cas. 66, 78 (J.C.)).
239 Id. at 449-50 (quoting CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 99 (1st ed. 1956)).
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Conversely, custodial interrogations normally take place in unfamiliar
places, where the suspect is isolated. 240 Experience has shown that in this
strange environment citizens are less likely to "be confident, indignant, or
recalcitrant," and police are given the "psychological advantage." 
241
Bus searches are more similar to custodial interrogations.242 The
passenger is "confronted by the police outside of his 'own familiar
territory,"' and "cannot simply leave the scene and repair to a safe haven to
avoid unwanted probing." 243 This gives officers the same psychological
advantages as in a custodial interrogation.244
Along with the general location of the questioning, the type of space in
which the questioning occurs during a bus search is similar to the space in a
custodial interrogation.245 According to the Supreme Court in Miranda,
whenever a person is "deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any
significant way," a custodial environment is created. 4 6 In Royer, a
situation where a man was confronted by two officers within a "small
enclosed area" was considered "an almost classic definition of
imprisonment. '" 247 This is contrasted with Fourth Amendment searches,
which occur in places where the person can get up and walk away, and
which "result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the
search.248 Passengers during a bus search do not have the opportunity to
walk away from the scene; doing so would lead to the risk of "being
stranded" in an unfamiliar place. 249 The passengers are enclosed in the bus,
surrounded by police officers who are watching their every move.250 And
since the bus drivers are usually absent until the search is over, the
passengers cannot go on with their daily lives.251' They have no choice but
to comply with the search until the police are satisfied and declare the
search over.
252
240 Id. at 450.
241 1d. at 449 (quoting CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 99 (1st ed. 1956)).
242 i.
243 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 448 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
244 Id.
245 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 211 (2002).
246 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
247 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 496 (1983) (quoting Royer v. State, 389 So.2d 1007,
1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
248 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
249 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991).
250 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 211.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 211-12.
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A third factor the Supreme Court uses to compare custodial and non-
custodial investigations is the organization of the search. 3  Custodial
interrogations occur in structured environments completely controlled by
the officers.254 In that environment, uniform guidelines are easier for
officers to follow. 255 Consensual interactions between police and citizens
generally "develop quickly," and occur "under informal and unstructured
conditions. 256 Therefore, to demand that officers follow set procedures
under these conditions is unrealistic.
Interdictions occurring on buses are like the custodial interrogations in
that they are more invariable. Bus searches are usually part of a police
program, and are routinely performed over long periods of time.257 At the
time of the respondent's arrest, the officers in the Drayton case had
conducted these routine searches at the Tallahassee bus station four or five
days every week for three years, searching up to seven buses a day.258 Also,
most officers conducting such searches are required to abide by strict
written guidelines.25 9  In fact, officers already almost always have a set
announcement which they make to passengers after boarding the bus.26°
Given such structure, it would be easy for officers to add a sentence to their
requisite announcement, clearly stating that the passengers have a right to
refuse to consent to the search.26'
253 See, e.g., id at 197 (The officers boarded the bus as part of a "routine drug and
weapons interdiction effort.").
254 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-56 (1966); see also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973).
255 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232.
256 Id.
257 See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at 3 n.4, Drayton (No. 01-631).
258 Id.; see also United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1396 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (where the
bus driver discussed "normal procedure" during these searches); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 431 (1991) ("County Sheriffs Department officers routinely board buses at scheduled
stops and ask passengers for permission to search their luggage.").
259 United States v. Cuevas-Ceja, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179 n.2 (D. Or. 1999) (where the
search instructions for the officers to follow have eighteen separate directives).
260 After all, the officers must make an announcement when requesting to search the bus
passengers. See, e.g., Bostick, 501 U.S. at 441 (noting that part of the routine of the
searching officers was to "identify themselves and announce their purpose").
261 Brief of Respondents at 9, Drayton (No. 01-631). Officer Lang admitted that
"advising passengers of their right to refuse takes 'only three to five seconds' and imposes
no 'additional burden' on him." Id.
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B. COURTS CURRENTLY DO NOT USE AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD
WHEN APPLYING THE TOTALITY-OF-CIRCUMSTANCES TEST TO A
SITUATION
During the oral argument of the Drayton case, one justice stated that
"an objective consideration [is] of the highest importance," when applying
the totality-of-circumstances test to a situation. 262 "Objective" is defined as
"of, relating to, or based on externally verifiable phenomena, as opposed to
an individual's perceptions, feelings, or intentions. 263 In consensual search
cases, by looking to "a reasonable man's interpretation of the conduct,"
judges believe that they are separating out their own beliefs.264  This
standard, ideally, is "flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of
police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, [even while] it calls for
consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of
the particular individual's response to the actions of the police.,
265
Certain factors have been declared per se coercive, including "the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled., 266  But these descriptions are vague, and
judges are still relied upon to interpret the specific factors in each situation.
In doing so, despite attempts not to, the judges rely on their own
experiences in determining what behavior is intimidating.267 This is why, in
opposing opinions, judges continue to point to one another's
"unwillingness ... to adhere to the 'reasonable person' standard., 268
In the context of bus searches, courts' disagreements over what is
"objectively" coercive conduct has led to contradictory court decisions. 6 9
262 Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002)
(No. 01-631).
263 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1101 (7th ed. 1999).
264 Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988).
265 id.
266 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
267 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 213 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority and the dissent "see" the situation differently).
268 California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 638 (1991).
269 See, e.g., United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204, 207 (D.C. 1990) (explaining that
a reasonable person would not "feel free to leave under the circumstances of a 'bus stop,' in
which officers board a narrow, cramped bus en route to another destination in order to
randomly question passengers"). But see United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1299, 1300
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that bus searches are not unconstitutional, and since a bus passenger
"voluntarily placed himself in tight quarters," this should not be important); United States v.
Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 711 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining that because a consensual search
occurred on a bus does not "automatically transform it into a seizure").
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The Supreme Court attempted to clear up such discrepancies in Bostick.27 °
Instead, the Court only managed to further complicate the totality-of-
circumstances test; disagreements among the justices persisted even within
the decision itself.27' The Supreme Court majority did not agree that the
factors that had swayed the State Supreme Court's decision to hold bus
searches unreasonably coercive were important. 272 Those factors, including
the passengers' confinement and the unfamiliar environment, were
secondary to other aspects of the search which upheld the actions of the
police.273  The Supreme Court felt that two different factors were
"particularly worth noting:" that the police informed Bostick of his "right to
refuse consent," and that the officers never threatened Bostick with a gun.
274
Because of these factors, the majority did not believe that that the officers
could have conveyed "a message that compliance with their requests is
required.,
27 5
Conversely, the three dissenters found that the facts of this particular
search "exhibit[ed] all of the elements of coercion associated with a typical
bus sweep." 276  They could not "understand how the majority [could]
possibly suggest" that passengers would feel free to refuse to comply with
the officers' requests.277 Where the majority held that the location of the
search is only of minimal importance, the dissent agreed with the State
Supreme Court that the cramped confines and unfamiliar location of the
search strongly "aggravates the coercive quality of such an encounter.,
278
Also, while the majority felt that there was no real show of authority
because the officers did not wield a gun, the dissent felt that the officers'
display of their badges, their "bright green 'raid' jackets bearing the
insignia of the Broward County Sheriffs Department," and the fact that one
officer "held a gun in a recognizable weapons pouch" were sufficient
grounds for declaring the conduct "an intimidating 'show of authority.'
279
The predictable result of such a split decision at the highest level has
led to more disagreement in the lower courts.280 In Washington, the
270 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
271 Id. at 440. Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented.
272 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435.
273 Id. at 433.
274 Id. at 432.
275 Id. at 437.
276 Id. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
277 Id. at 445 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
278 Id. at 448-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
279 Id. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
280 See United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354 (1 1th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
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Eleventh Circuit majority held that the bus search at issue "was consciously
designed to take full advantage of a coercive environment, 281 while the
dissent concluded that this search was reasonable. 282 The policeman's
conduct was an impermissible and coercive 'show of authority' when he
"held his badge above his head and identified himself as a federal agent...
[and] announced what he wanted the passengers to do, and what he was
going to do. 283 Yet the dissenter felt that the reasonable man would not
have been intimidated because during the search the officers were not in
uniform.284 Also, he believed the search would not have intimidated people
because there was no officer standing at the front of the bus, and the
officers left the aisles open while they questioned the passengers.285 In
Guapi, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and found
the officers' conduct impermissible, despite conceding that, as the District
Court found, the officers "did not touch or grab Defendant, block his path
of regress, or retain something of value from him., 286 Because the officers
began questioning at the front of the bus, an officer stayed in the driver's
seat throughout the search, and no warning was given, the permissible
actions that the District Court stressed meant little.287
Even Drayton, the Court's most recent attempt to clarify the test,
simply resulted in more irreconcilably different interpretations of the
coerciveness of a search.288 The justices disagreed on the threshold at
which a reasonable person would become intimidated. 289 The majority of
the Supreme Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's holding that
reasonable people would have felt obliged to consent during the bus
search. 290 The passengers would not be intimidated since Lang "did not
brandish a weapon or make any intimidating movements. He left the aisle
free so that respondents could exit. He spoke to passengers one-by-one and
in a polite, quiet voice., 291 The presence of Hoover at the front of the bus
281 Washington, 151 F.3d at 1357.
282 Id. at 1358.
283 Id. at 1357.
284 Id. at 1358 (Black, J., dissenting).
285 Id. at 1358 (Black, J., dissenting).
286 United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1395 (11 th Cir. 1998).
287 Id. at 1396.
288 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002). Justices Souter, Stevens and
Ginsburg dissented.
289 The majority held that "the officers gave the passengers no reason to believe that they
were required to answer the officers' questions," id. at 203, while the dissent held that the
officers' actions made clear that "cooperation is expected." Id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
290 Id. at 205.
291 Id. at 204.
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was unimportant because the officer "did nothing to intimidate passengers,
and he said nothing to suggest that people could not exit.' 292 The display of
the badge should have "little weight in the analysis," since such marks of
authority are meant to provide "assurance, not discomfort." 293  Also, the
simple fact that the officers were armed, is "unlikely to contribute to the
coerciveness of the encounter," according to the majority, because
passengers would only be scared if the gun was actually brandished.294
The dissent found that these same actions were sufficient to constitute
coerciveness, arguing that police conduct "may overbear a normal person's
ability to act freely, even in the absence of explicit commands or the
formalities of detention." 295 According to Souter, the majority was not
being rational and, by combining all the "relevant facts" of the case, it was
clear that "an atmosphere of obligatory participation was established.,
296
The factors contributing to this interpretation included the display of
badges; Hoover's positioning by the exit; the questioning of passengers at
close range; the cramped quarters of the bus; the absence of the bus driver
with the passengers' tickets; the initial announcement's phrasing,
commanding that the officers "would like . . . cooperation" rather than
asking for cooperation; and the delay of travel while the search was being
conducted.297 These dissenting justices felt that the officer's polite tone of
voice would not comfort the reasonable person because "a police officer
who is certain to get his way has no need to shout., 298 Also, individual
questioning which began with "Do you mind . ," meant little after the
scene of "obligatory participation" had already been set.299
The conclusion of Justice Souter's dissent clearly displays how
evaluations of a situation are based on individual perceptions of the
circumstances. 300 Expressing his incredulity at the majority's holding, he
writes that it is obvious that "the majority cannot see what [the dissent
292 Id. at 205.
293 Id. at 204. In the transcript of the oral arguments, there was some discussion over
how Hoover's position may be intimidating. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Drayton
(No. 01-631).
... Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205. However, the Court does admit that most people on the
bus probably knew that the officers were armed, since "everybody knows" that officers are
always armed when on duty. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7-8, Drayton (No. 01-631).
... Drayton, 536 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
297 Id. at 212-13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
298 Id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
299 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
300 Id. at 213 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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does]." 301 The use of this word, "see," exaggerates the lack of objectivity
and also reflects why such diverse ideas of how a "reasonable" person
would act in certain situations persist.
30 2
C. COURTS DO NOT TAKE CERTAIN IMPORTANT FACTORS INTO
CONSIDERATION WHEN APPLYING THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST TO A SITUATION
Certain factors that exacerbate the coerciveness of a bus search are not
being sufficiently and consistently considered by courts when examining
the circumstances of a search, resulting in even more infringements on
citizens' rights.30 3 Three such factors are the individual characteristics of
the bus passenger, 30 4 the phrasing of the questions posed by police during
their searches,30 5 and the psychological influences which affect citizens'
responses to the police officers and the search.30 6 A mandatory warning
would mitigate each of these problems.
30 7
The totality-of-circumstances test used in consensual search cases does
not take into account the individual characteristics or knowledge of the
person giving the consent.308 A reliance on the "reasonable person" is
intended to "ensure ... that the scope of the Fourth Amendment protection
does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being
approached.309 It also allows the Court to make certain assumptions.10 In
bus search cases, there is an assumption that the reasonable citizen will
"know and ... exercise his rights or her rights." 311 This idea enables the
Court to shift part of the Government's burden; the prosecutor no longer
has to prove that the citizen understood that the search was voluntary.3 2
However, such an assumption also "ignores the demographic realities of the
301 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
302 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
303 Callahan, supra note 2, at 394-415.
304 See infra notes 308-22.
305 See infra notes 323-32.
306 See infra notes 333-58.
307 Adrian J. Barrio, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience
Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
215, 247.
308 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Drayton (No. 01-631) (questioning whether the
Government should be required "to educate citizens as to their rights in every encounter").
309 Barrio, supra note 307, at 247.
310 Id.
311 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Drayton (No. 01-631).
312 Mitchell, supra note 20, at 1078.
2003] 1085
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
reasonable bus passenger." 313 People who travel by bus are generally less
educated than the average citizen, and know less about their Constitutional
rights.314 But the static "reasonable person" standard does not take this
ignorance into account, and "places the burden of knowing one's right to
refuse consent squarely on individual citizens-not law enforcement. 315
As a result, those with less knowledge, like the average bus passenger, are
punished because of their ignorance.
31 6
The Miranda Court realized the weakness of making assumptions
based upon a reasonable person standard.317 There, the Court described
citizens who do not understand their constitutional rights as "helpless," and
held that they should not be penalized for that ignorance.318 The Court also
recognized that any "reasonable person" assumption will always "favor the
defendant whose sophistication or status had fortuitously prompted him" to
know how to respond to the situation at hand.319 Therefore, the Court chose
to use a standard that assumes that no one knows their rights. 320 A warning,
the only "ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of [his] right,"
became mandatory in every case.32' If the Court condemns such
assumptions in custodial interrogations, it seems wrong to then rely on
these same assumptions as a shortcut in search and seizure cases.
322
A second factor that is generally not taken into consideration by courts
is the wording of the questions that police ask the passengers.3 23 Though
subtle, this factor can greatly influence the direction that a search may
take.324  For example, in Drayton, Officer Lang's question to the
Respondents, "Do you mind if I check [your bag]?, 325 is problematic
because
no matter how the subject answers, it can be interpreted by the testifying officer as
313 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Drayton (No. 01-631).
314 Id. at 42.
315 Mitchell, supra note 20, at 1076.
316 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Drayton (No. 01-631).
317 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
318 Id.
319 Id. (quoting People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 369-70 (1965)).
320 id.
321 Id. at 472.
322 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203 (2002) (rejecting the requirement that
passengers be warned).
323 Respondents' Brief at 41-42, Drayton (No. 01-63 1).
324 See T. Holgraves, Communication in Context: Effects of Speaker Status on the
Comprehension of Indirect Requests, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, &
COGNITION 1205 (1994).
325 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199.
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affirmative consent. That is, if Brown had said, 'Yes,' it could be interpreted as 'Yes,
you may check me for weapons.' Conversely, if he had answered, 'No,' it could be
interpreted as 'No, I don't mind.'
326
Studies have shown that often these types of indirect questions are really
subtle demands and not truly inquiries regarding willingness.327
Furthermore, this type of questioning always leaves the citizen at the
328control of the officer. No matter how the passenger responds, the officer
can always claim a good faith belief that the passenger had consented to the
search.329
By being advised of their rights at the beginning of the investigation,
the bus passengers may prepare themselves to withhold consent to the
search, despite how the officers phrase their individual requests for
permission.330 They are not put on the spot as much. 331 Also, because the
warning acknowledges the passengers' rights, these people can be more
assured that the officers are "prepared to recognize" their right to refuse
consent and will not bully them into complying.
332
The third factor which should be considered is the psychological
pressures exerted on the passengers during these bus searches.333 Courts do
not adequately consider the data which psychological studies have
uncovered: "police-initiated encounters and attendant search requests
conducted in the close confines of a bus engender psychological pressures
on passengers to comply and can result in grants of consent to search that
are not voluntarily given, but are in fact the product of police coercion."
334
Several studies have demonstrated that people do not always respond
rationally to the demands of authority figures.33 5 One study, conducted by
Leonard Bickman, determined that symbols of authority can hugely impact
326 Respondents' Brief at 42, Drayton (No. 01-631).
327 Id. at 42 n.34.
328 See, e.g., H.H. Clark, Responding to Indirect Speech Acts, I1 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
430 (1979); R.W. Gibbs, Do People Always Process the Literal Meaning of Indirect
Requests?, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 524 (1983).
32' Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199.
330 Barrio, supra note 307, at 247.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Callahan, supra note 2, at 394.
334 Id. at 416.
335 Barrio, supra note 307, at 238-39. Bickman had three experimenters each dress up in
a different outfit-as a business man in a sports jacket and tie, a milkman, and a guard. Each
experimenter would confront pedestrians on the street randomly and command the
pedestrian to perform a task. Seventy-five percent of the subjects obeyed the guard's
command, forty-seven percent obeyed the milkman and twenty-nine percent obeyed the
civilian. Id.
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a person's conduct. 336 Based on people's recognition of certain uniforms,
Bickman found that authority figures perceived to be high on the social
hierarchy were able to exert a lot of control over people.337 This power is
rooted, Bickman believes, in Americans' learned belief that such agents are
meant to help society; any demands they make must serve some beneficial
purpose and should be followed.338 A second well-known study illustrated
what occurs when such an authority figure makes unreasonable or illogical
demands on a person. 339  Stanley Milgram found that a person is more
likely to follow the demands of a legitimate authority figure than he is to
follow his own internal system of beliefs, even when the two are
incompatible.34 °
In bus searches, the officers' symbols of authority, including their
uniforms and badges, are signs to the passengers of the officers' authority,
and reminders that these police have ultimate control over the situation.34'
Furthermore, the bus driver's deference to the officers, leaving them to
control the bus, reflects the police's power.342 The officers have the ability
to control the movements of the bus and the movements of the
passengers. 343  The result of such authority is an obviously "marked
discrepancy ... between the status of the detained citizen and the status of
the police officer." 344 When confronted with such an authority figure, a
citizen is likely to concede to requests made of them, even when, as in the
case of the Drayton Respondents, compliance is not in one's best
interests.345
336 Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 47, 58
(1974).
337 Id. at 58-59.
338 id.
339 Barrio, supra note 307, at 234.
340 Id. at 237. In Milgram's experiment, the subject was assigned the role of a 'teacher,'
who was told to ask a 'learner' a variety of questions. Whenever the learner (who was a
confederate of the experimenter) answered a question wrong, the teacher was commanded to
administer an electric shock to the learner. As the learner audibly expressed increasing
discomfort at the shocks, the experimenter used verbal prods to encourage the teacher to
continue the test. Milgram measured "the point at which the teacher's moral resolve
exceeded the pressure of obedience." Sixty-five percent of the teachers proceeded to shock
the learner up to the maximum voltage level. Id. at 234-36.
341 Callahan, supra note 2, at 410.
342 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 211 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
343 Id.
344 Barrio, supra note 307, at 240.
341 Id. at 241.
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The confined environment also has a psychological impact on the
passengers.346 While the Court held that the confinement during a bus
search is minimal, since the passengers chose to confine themselves,347 a
person's comfort in a certain environment has been found only to extend to
the actions that the person had intended to take in that space.348 In the case
of a bus passenger, the intended use of the space is to travel; once the space
changes into an interrogation room, the sense of confinement also must be
adjusted.349 In terms of the actual questioning, the Court does not consider
how the close confines affect a person's responses to the actual
questioning. 350 When speaking to Drayton, Officer Lang's face was only
twelve to eighteen inches away from Drayton's face. 35' The eighteen
inches around a person are considered intimate space; studies have shown
that an invasion of that space results in "emotional distress, physiological
reactions, and . .. loss of control. 352 Thus, such close proximity is an
invasion of personal space, and likely affected Drayton's response to the
situation.353
Brief warnings can help minimize the "instinctive reaction to the
police officer's perceived legitimacy. Such a warning would counter the
reflexive obedience most citizens have towards authority figures, by
"dispelling the socially-engineered belief' that one cannot disobey a law
enforcement official.355 Even a citizen who knows his rights abstractly may
find that, when confronted in the actual situation, he does not have the
capacity to stand up to the authority figure. 35 6 When that figure begins the
interaction by reminding the citizen of his rights, it strengthens the person's
ability to stand up to the figure and actually exercise this right.3 57 Later
intimidation, like the close face-to-face questioning, therefore can be
responded to more rationally.
358
346 Callahan, supra note 2, at 399.
347 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 439 (1991).
348 Michael A. Weinstein, Coercion, Space, and the Modes of Human Domination,
COERCION 63, 65 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972).
349 Callahan, supra note 2, at 399 n.167.
350 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002).
351 United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 789 (11 th Cir. 2000).
352 Respondents' Brief at 33 n.26, Drayton (No.01-631).
353 id.







D. A BRIGHT-LINE RULE WILL NOT DRAMATICALLY HINDER THE
SUCCESS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS.
Bus searches performed without warnings "are undoubtedly successful
in ferreting out some unspecified amount of drugs and thus removing such
material from the street., 359 Therefore, a main hindrance to the passage of a
bright-line warning requirement is the fear that such a warning would
seriously hinder the success rate of these searches in seeking out illegal
drugs and weapons. 360 The actual impact, though, may be minimal.
Citizens choose to consent to searches for a variety of reasons, only
one of which is coercion. 361 Innocent passengers, with nothing to hide, will
not be affected by the warning, and may consent simply to prove their
innocence.362 Guilty suspects may have reason to still consent, despite
knowing their rights.363 Many suspects, like Drayton and Brown, attempt to
conceal their drugs and think that they can convince the officers of their
innocence by consenting to the search.3 64  These people would allow a
search in spite of the warning.365 Others may not realize that they have
something that is illegal, or may not think that whatever they have is serious
enough to have any dramatic consequences.366 The warning will not let all
guilty people "get away with it," but will guarantee that when people do
consent, they do not do so because of ignorance.367 The notice gives people
knowledge of the options that they have; what people choose to do with that
knowledge is up to them.368
Officers also will not suddenly be struck helpless by such a
requirement. 369 Despite the risk that they cannot immediately search a
suspicious subject, officers can continue to pursue the suspect until they
have sufficient probable cause for a search warrant. 370 Also, if officers are
so suspicious of a passenger that they believe they need to immediately
359 Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. at 8, Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (No. 89-1717).
360 Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. at 10, United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No. 01-631).
361 Barrio, supra note 307, at 244.
362 id





368 Id. at 245-46.
369 Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1260 (1983).
370 Id.
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search the person, they likely have sufficient reasonable suspicion to
perform a Terry frisk.371
A second problem associated with the warning is the fear that such
mandatory procedures may "greatly increase the administrative and
operational burden of screening and interacting with passengers."
372
However, these additional problems are mere speculation, and must be
contrasted against the resources currently used by courts in trying to
objectively collect and analyze the facts of each situation when applying the
totality-of-circumstances test.373  As discussed above, recent cases keep
rising to appellate courts, and no consistent guidelines have been
established for determining when situations are coercive. 374 The confusion
and inconsistency of the current system is a greater burden than an
additional sentence at the beginning of each search. 375 After all, courts
already encourage the use of warnings as much as possible, and these
warnings are encouraged in police manuals and handbooks.376 A warning is
not a novel or outrageous idea, but is one that is known to work377 and
simple to implement.378
VI. CONCLUSION
Blocking the Eleventh Circuit's attempts to implement a per se rule,
the Court in Drayton held that verbal announcements to bus passengers that
notify them of their constitutional right to refuse to be searched, were not
mandatory. 379  The United States Supreme Court held that as long as
officers do not give the passengers any reason to believe that their
compliance is required, a search done with the person's consent is
constitutional.380 To determine whether officers acted in a manner which
371 For example, in Drayton, after Brown was arrested, officers may have had sufficient
reasonable suspicion to frisk Drayton even if he had not consented to the search. United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002).
372 Brief of Amicus Curiae of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. at 10,
Drayton (No. 01-63 1).
373 See supra Part V-B.
374 id.
375 Respondents' Brief at 17, Drayton (No. 01-631).
376 Id. at 26 n.21.
377 After all, the Supreme Court recently applauded the continued success of the bright-
line rule in the Fifth Amendment context, holding that the per se rule is easier "for law
enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner," than a
totality-of-circumstances test. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
378 Respondents' Brief at 26 n.21, Drayton (No. 01-631).
379 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203 (2002).
380 Id. at 203-04.
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unreasonably intimidated the bus passengers, courts must use a totality-of-
circumstances test.38" ' Judges must look at the factors involved in each
specific situation to decide whether the passengers on the bus would feel
that they could freely decline to answer the officers' questions without any
fear of repercussions.
382
The totality-of-circumstances test is ineffective, inconsistently applied,
and flawed. A bright-line rule which requires officers to tell bus passengers
of their right to refuse to consent should be implemented.383  Searches
conducted on buses hold the same risks of coercion as custodial
interrogations and therefore, just as the Miranda Court held a bright-line
rule necessary to counter coercion in that setting, a bright-line rule is
necessary for consensual bus searches. 384 The totality-of-circumstances test
is not objectively or consistently applied by the courts, and certain
important factors are not currently being taken into consideration by
courts.385  A bright-line rule would also clear up confusion by giving
officers a clear statement on how to proceed in consensual bus searches and
allowing courts to hand down consistent and clear decisions.
3 86
The importance of protecting citizens' fundamental rights has become
especially pressing in the wake of September 11, 2001.387 Americans are
more worried about their safety than ever before, and new measures are
being implemented to keep the public secure.388 However, such security
concerns do not give the Government the right to disregard the
constitutional rights of American citizens; in fact, these are the liberties the
United States claims to be fighting to protect. 389 In the Fourth Amendment
arena, the Court has been trying to balance priorities.390 And in cases such
as Drayton, the Court has chosen to increase officers' ability to uncover
381 id.
382 Id. at 201.
383 See supra Parts V-A, V-B, V-C, and V-D.
384 See supra Part V-A.
385 See supra Parts V-B and V-C.
386 See supra Part V-D.
387 Mitchell, supra note 20, at 1076.
388 See, e.g., Federal Agency Protection of Privacy Act: Hearing on H.R. 4561 Before the
House Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, 107th Cong. 10 (2002)
(statement of Lori L. Waters, Executive Director, Eagle Forum) (stating that measures such
as National I.D. cards and government databases to track Americans are being considered to
increase security).
389 See American Civil Liberties Union, Advertisements Urge Senate to Guarantee
Homeland Security Legislation Not Become a "Bill of Wrongs" (Sept. 30, 2002), available
at http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=10810&c=24.
390 Mitchell, supra note 20, at 1078.
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illegal drugs and weapons at the cost of citizens' rights. 391 However, "no
system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for
its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness
of their constitutional rights."392 By adding a warning before conducting
consensual bus searches, officers can still do their jobs, but without
ignoring the rights of the individual citizen.393
Marissa Reich
391 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. at 9,
Bostick (No. 89-1717) (stating their fear that bus searches must require a level of suspicion
in order to protect "citizens against the arbitrary and often abusive techniques employed in
totalitarian societies").
392 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
393 Craig M. Bradley, The Court's Curious Consent Search Doctrine, TRIAL, Oct. 2002,
at 72, 74.
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